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EXORCISING OUR FREE EXERCISE
JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW INTERPRETATION
OF FREE EXERCISE IN PLEASANT GLADE
ASSEMBLY OF GOD V. SCHUBERT
Thomas Clark*
INTRODUCTION
The idea is a grand one-that the "legislature should 'make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and
,,2 3State. Jefferson's expression of the Religion Clauses, as requiring an
absolute divorce between religion and government,4 rested on the notion
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
1. 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). Pleasant Glade Assembly of God merged with
First Assembly of God to form Colleyville Assembly of God, a member-church of
the General Council of Assemblies of God. Pastor Lloyd McCutchen, formerly
pastor of Pleasant Glade, now presides as pastor of Colleyville.
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, et al., A Comm.
of the Danbury Baptist Association, In the State of Conn. (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh
eds., 1904) (quoting the Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution).
3. The religion clauses in the First Amendment refer to the Establishment
Clause, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion," and the Free Exercise Clause, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2004)
(arguing that Jefferson's interpretation of the religion clauses required a strict
separation between church and state); but see, DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002)
(arguing that Jefferson understood the religion clauses to be federalism provisions
that ensured the liberty of the states to be free from a federally established religion
and did not require a strict separation of church and state).
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that "religion is a matter which lies solely between Man and his God.",
5
This principle was one shared by a number of Jefferson's
contemporaries6 and is, no doubt, one shared by a great number of
Americans today.7 However, this "wall of separation,"8 which Jefferson
presumes to be the naturally arising construct of the First Amendment, is
more permeable than Jefferson's letter acknowledges and perhaps more
than he realized. Indeed, Jefferson recognized that the legislature has the
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, et al. in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (ca. June 20, 1785) ("We maintain therefore that in
matters of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society
and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."); THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE
OF REASON, PART THE FIRST, BEING AN INVESTIGATION OF TRUE AND FABULOUS
THEOLOGY 4 (H.D. SYMONDS 1795) ("The adulterous connection of church and state
... had so effectually prohibited, by pains and penalties, every discussion upon
established creeds, and upon first principles of religion, that until the system of
government should be changed, those subjects could not be brought fairly and
openly before the world ...."); BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 73 (Louis P. Masur, ed., Bedford/St. Martin's, 2003) ("My
Parent's [sic] had early given me religious Impressions, and brought me through my
Childhood piously in the Dissenting Way. But I was scarce 15 when, after doubting
by turns of several Points as I found them disputed in the different Books I read, I
began to doubt of Revelation it self [sic]").
7. A recent report by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found that if
we are "[1]ooking only at changes from one major religious tradition to another (e.g.,
from Protestantism to Catholicism, or from Judaism to no religion), more than one-
in-four U.S. adults (28 percent) have changed their religious affiliation from that in
which they were raised. If change of affiliation within the ranks of Protestantism
(e.g., from Baptist to Methodist) and within the unaffiliated population (e.g., from
nothing in particular to atheist) is included, roughly 44 percent of Americans now
profess a religious affiliation that is different from the religion in which they were
raised." Further, these numbers do not include the many changes in affiliation
within a particular denomination (e.g., from American Baptist Churches in the USA
to the Southern Baptist Convention). This lack of allegiance to childhood religious
affiliations underscores the deeply personal nature of religion in the lives of many
Americans. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 22 (Feb.
2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-
study-full.pdf.
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, et al. in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2.
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power to regulate actions, and not opinions,9 but lacked the foresight to
recognize that in many instances actions are inextricably bound with
opinions-particularly actions associated with religious opinions.' 
0
Nonetheless, the First Amendment, by the language of the
religion clauses guarantees freedom from congressional interference in
religious practices." Despite the assuring language of the religion
clauses, however, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to
develop a consistent interpretation capable of resolving the many
contentious issues implicated by the language to apply to this area of
• • 12
First Amendment jurisprudence. This struggle for consistency and
fairness has only become more muddled in recent years, owing to
congressional attempts to enact "clarifying" legislative measures,13 the
ever-intensifying Kulturkampf that ensues with every executive,
legislative, or judicial action touching religion, 4 and the increasingly
9. See id. at 281 ("[T]he legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions....").
10. Religious traditions of every stripe either require or advise adherents to
practice or participate in particular rites and rituals in addition to adherence to
particular beliefs as a condition of being a faithful congregant (e.g. Roman
Catholicism requires that its adherents are baptized and regularly participate in the
celebration of the Eucharist; The Muslim faith instructs its adherents to give one-
fortieth of their income to the needy and to fast every day from sunup to sundown
during the holy month of Ramadan; Orthodox Judaism proscribes the consumption
of specific foods and advises particular rituals to be followed during the Sabbath;
Hinduism likewise mandates a strict dietary regime). FRANK SALAMONE,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS RITES, RITUALS AND FESTIVALS 305, 355-57, 204-05,
174 (Routledge 2004).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
12. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "the historical record [of the religion clauses]
is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either side of
the proposition.").
13. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2000) (requiring courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard when analyzing any and
all free exercise claims).
14. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) ("The Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us is not the
manifestation of a 'bare ... desire to harm' homosexuals, [citation omitted] but is
2009] EXORCISING OUR FREE EXERCISE
divisive nature of the various factions that advocate for one side of the
"cultural wars" or another.15
It is in the midst of this contentious atmosphere that the Supreme
Court has attempted to formulate a constitutional test that is both
objective in its approach and sensitive to the religious tradition of the
American people. 16 Much of the trouble lies in drawing a line between
what constitutes reachable, secular activity and unreachable, religious
activity. In the context of tort law, this line becomes even more blurred
as courts attempt to determine in which activities it may and may not
prohibit religious entities from engaging. Surprisingly, the Supreme
Court has not specifically established any sort of standard for analyzing
claims concerning the liability, or lack thereof, of "religious institutions"
for "otherwise cognizable tort claims."' 7 Courts are left to derive the
principles of free exercise jurisprudence in cases of tort liability from the
larger context of the Supreme Court's rulings on the constitutionality of
legislative action.
rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through use of the laws.").
15. See generally, JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE
TO DEFINE AMERICA (Basic Books 1992) (describing the clash of ideologies in the
United States); see also Editorial, Commandments in Context, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2005, at A24 (noting the prominence of the Supreme Court in the "culture wars"
through a decision concerning the display of the Ten Commandments), cf Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is clear from this
[decision] that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of
assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are
observed."); Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court takes
sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and
more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer
class from which the Court's Members are drawn.").
16. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (noting the Court's
"cases ... point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One face
looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout
our Nation's history. . . . The other face looks toward the principle that
governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious
freedom").
17. See Jeffrey R. Anderson, et al., The First Amendment: Churches Seeking
Sanctuary For The Sins Of The Fathers, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617, 618 (2004)
(citing Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 353 (Fla. 2002)).
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This article evaluates the standard that the Texas Supreme Court
applied in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert. 8 In that case,
the Court expanded the scope of the Free Exercise protections to
immunize churches and other religious institutions from tortious liability
when claims of intangible damages arise out of actions associated with
the church's belief system, regardless of the physically assaulting nature
of the church's conduct, out of which the defendant's injuries arise.' 9
This, I believe and will argue, is too expansive a view of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
20
On June 8, 1996, Laura Schubert, the seventeen-year-old
daughter of Tom and Judy Schubert, attended an overnight youth group
activity at the family's church, Pleasant Glade Assembly of God. While
at the event, Laura, along with the rest of the youth and the youth
minister Rod Linzay, became convinced that a demon had been seen in
the sanctuary of the church and that other demons were present. In an
attempt to cast out the demons, Linzay had the youth anoint everything
with holy water. Around 4:30 in the morning, Linzay roused the youth
to describe a prophetic vision of a cloud of the presence of God.
That Sunday at the evening worship service, after having
participated in a youth garage sale the day before and having attended the
Sunday morning service, Laura collapsed. Laura's collapse prompted
several members of the congregation to take Laura to a classroom and
"lay hands"21 on her and pray. Laura claims that while performing the
18. 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Id. at 3-5 (Facts of the case are drawn from the majority opinion's
summary).
21. According to the General Council of the Assemblies of God (an assembly
of churches that include the Colleyville Assembly of God church) the laying of
hands ritual was a common practice in the Early Church in which Jesus would lay
hands on people before healing them. See http://www.ag.org/TOP/BELIEFS/Gen
doct_12_sick.cfm. "The General Council of the Assemblies of God has recognized
divine healing for the whole person as an important part of the gospel [and the]
354 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 7
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"laying hands" ritual, the "church members forcibly held her arms
crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed. 2 According to
those present, "Laura clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, foamed at the
mouth, made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked, sweated, and
hallucinated. 23  After she ceased resisting the restraint and began
"compl[ying] with requests to say the name 'Jesus[,]' 24 Laura was
released and allowed to leave.
The following Wednesday evening, at a youth service, Laura
collapsed again. According to Laura, Linzay directed the youth and his
wife, Holly, to hold her down in the "spread eagle" position. Several
youth members held down her arms and legs while the senior pastor,
Lloyd McCutchen, placed his hand on Laura's forehead. In the struggle,
Laura sustained scrapes, bruises, and carpet bums.
In July, Laura began to suffer from nightmares, claiming she felt
as though "'a demon [was] in her room at night. '''25 Further, Laura also
displayed additional signs of emotional strain over the following months.
Psychologists and psychiatrists found she suffered from "angry
outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness ... hallucinations, self-mutilation,
fear of abandonment, and agoraphobia.' '26 Laura also began exhibiting
signs that she was increasingly depressed and suicidal, which led her to
drop out of high school and abandon plans to attend college or pursue
missionary work. In November, Laura was diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder which was attributed to her physical restraint at
the church in June.
Laura and her parents filed a lawsuit against Pleasant Glade,
Lloyd McCutchen, Rod Linzay, and other church members. Laura
claimed she suffered "'mental, emotional and psychological injuries
including physical pain, mental anguish, fear, humiliation,
embarrassment, physical and emotional distress, post-traumatic stress
Assemblies of God constitution in its Statement of Fundamental Truths, section 12,
states: 'Divine healing is an integral part of the gospel. Deliverance from sickness
is provided for in the atonement, and is privilege of all believers. See,
http://ag.org/top/Beliefs/Position-Papers/pp-downloads/pp-4184_healing.pdf.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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disorder[,] and loss of employment' ''27 due to Pleasant Glade's actions.
She alleged negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, assault,
battery, loss of consortium, and child abuse.
Pleasant Glade, along with the other defendants, responded by
seeking a protective order and moved to dismiss the action "as an
unconstitutional burden on their religious practices."2 8 In the following
mandamus proceeding, the court of appeals granted Pleasant Glade's
request for relief and dismissed the claims of negligence, gross
negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, child abuse, and loss of consortium, claiming that these were
religious claims and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the court under the
First Amendment. The trial court then "signed a protective order,
prohibiting the Schuberts from inquiring into or debating the religious
teachings, practices, or beliefs of the Pentecostal or Assembly of God
churches.,,29 At trial, a jury awarded Laura damages in the amount of
$300,000, finding that Laura had been assaulted and falsely imprisoned
by McCutchen, Linzay and several church members. Subsequently,
Pleasant Glade moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
church asserted its free exercise rights under the state and federal
constitutions. The court of appeals eliminated the damages for lost
earnings because the calculation was too remote and speculative, but
otherwise affirmed the jury verdict.
ANALYSIS
I. Development and Current Status of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court confronted the Free Exercise Clause for the
first time in Reynolds v. United States.30 In that case, the Court first
articulated the principles encompassed by the Free Exercise Clause,
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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giving ascertainable form to its previously ambiguous language. The
Court began by setting the broadest of parameters in applying the First
Amendment. Reynolds concerned the constitutionality of applying a
state statute prohibiting the practice of polygamy to a religious sect (i.e.
Mormons) that claimed exception to the statute owing to a tenet of its
faith that commanded the taking of more than one wife for each man.31
In the opinion, Chief Justice Waite noted that, "[1]aws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."32 Immediately
after entering the arena of Free Exercise jurisprudence in Reynolds, the
Court began setting boundaries on the scope of the protections of the
Free Exercise Clause.
The Court limited the application of the Free Exercise Clause by
adopting a bifurcated view of human activity, or, in this case, religious
activity, as being comprised of two components: (1) activities that
involve actions and (2) activities that involve beliefs and opinions. The
latter of these two components enjoys absolute immunity from
governmental control, while the former exists within the limits of such
control.33 Thus, it was quickly established that the Free Exercise Clause
does not place the regulation of all religious practice entirely outside the
reach of Congress.34 Over the next century, this framework endured and
the sentiment was confirmed in Braunfeld v. Brown,35 when Chief Justice
Warren wrote, "[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is
absolute." 36
This categorical nuance in the Court's decisions revealed that the
Free Exercise Clause provides only limited protection to religiously
motivated actions. Belief and the actions required by belief were,
31. Id. at 161.
32. Id. at 166.
33. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he [First]
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society." (citing Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890))).
34. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions ... .
35. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
36. Id. at 603.
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according to the Court, both components of "free exercise" that the First
Amendment seeks to protect. 37 However, the Court has maintained that
while the Free Exercise Clause protects both of these components, they
do not both enjoy the same degree of protection. In the same vein, the
Court recently articulated a "distinction between the absolute
constitutional protection against governmental regulation of religious
beliefs on the one hand, and the qualified protection against the
regulation of religiously motivated conduct on the other ....
Though the necessity of this division of activity-limiting the
scope of the government's jurisdiction-may seem clear and obvious, the
difficulties arising from its application and the consequent adjudication
of Free Exercise claims are anything but apparent. As mentioned earlier,
drawing a distinction between a religious "belief [or] opinion" and a
religious "practice" is not as precise in the real world as it is in the minds
of jurists. Often, "religious practice ... and [religious] belief[] ... are so
closely intertwined" as to make distinguishing between the two an
exceptionally problematic task. 40 This fact, however, has never
41prevented courts from adjudicating the "act" component of a claim.
37. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, 303 ("The constitutional inhibition of
legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it
forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe
and freedom to act.").
38. See id. at 304 (stating that the government may not prohibit the distribution
of religious ideas, but may regulate the manner in which this is done on the streets in
the interest of safety).
39. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485 U.S. 660, 670-71 n.13 (1988).
40. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2008).
41. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding that a controlled substance law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause and
so the religious act of using peyote could constitutionally be prohibited); following
the Court's decision in Smith II Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993. See infra note 13. This legislative directive reversed the decision in
Smith II by providing that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
[Vol. 7
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42It was not until the 1960s, in Sherbert v. Verner, that the Court
developed a constitutional test that attempted to alleviate the problems
associated with the bifurcated view established in Reynolds.43 In
Sherbert, the Court adopted a strict scrutiny standard for evaluating laws
burdening the free exercise of religion. The standard led the Court to
declare unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman
who was discharged from her job because she refused to work on
Saturday.
Then, in Smith 11,44 the Free Exercise Clause analysis was
abruptly altered. There, the Court adopted a "neutral law of general
applicability" standard and held that a law of such character could not be
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause.45 In other words, a law needs
only to abstain from singling out religious activity for punishment in
order to pass constitutional muster. The burden the law places on a
particular religious practice becomes irrelevant. Under Smith II, a law
will be upheld as constitutional so long as it does not target religious
behavior specifically. In Smith II, the Court upheld a law prohibiting the
use of peyote, even though the law interfered with the religious practices
of certain Native American religions that claimed peyote to be essential
to their religious rituals. The Court explained that the law's intent was
not to punish behavior because it was religiously motivated as it applied
to everyone in the state. In contrast, however, the Court declared a city
ordinance that prohibited the sacrifice of animals to be unconstitutional
46because it was directed at punishing a particular religion.
Following the Smith II decision, a neutral law of general
applicability only had to survive rational basis review in order to pass
constitutional muster, while laws directed at religious practices have to
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except ... in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
[using] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." 42 C.F.R. § 2000bb-l(a) - (b)(l) and (2).
42. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. Id. at 882.
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-57
(1993).
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survive strict scrutiny. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19934"
was Congress's attempt to reverse the Court. The Act provided that its
purpose was to negate the effects of the Smith II decision and restore
strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise Clause analysis. The Act, in effect,
would erase the two-category approach of Smith. In 1997, in City of
Boerne v. Flores,48 the Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional
as applied to state and local governments, because it exceeded the scope
of Congress's powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Act appears to remain in force and to be constitutional as
applied to the federal government.49
II. "Laying Hands " Ritual
The Texas Supreme Court framed the substantive issue facing it
in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God as "whether the church's religious
practice of 'laying hands' is entitled to First Amendment protection.
50
The court casually accepts what happened in the incident with Schubert
as being a part of the "laying hands" ritual that the Assembly of God
practices as part of its religious rituals. However, before determining
whether certain actions that are part of a religious ceremony may be
proscribed, the court must first determine whether the actions in question
are part of a religious ritual at all.
According to the senior pastor for Pleasant Glade Assembly of
God, Lloyd McCutchen:
Many people did 'lay hands' on Laura Schubert and
pray [sic] for her, according to the custom of our
church. This type of activity happens on a very
regular basis in our church, since we believe in the
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb (2000).
48. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
49. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Bruce
Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding RFRA as applied to the federal
government).
50. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.
2008).
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physical conduct of laying hands on persons in order
to pray for them.5'
The description that McCutchen gives to the court bears little
resemblance to the description of events given by Laura Schubert.
According to her testimony:
• . . church members forcibly held her arms crossed
over her chest, despite her demands to be freed" 52
and "the youth, under the direction of Linzay and his
wife, Holly, held her down . . . in a 'spread eagle'
position with several youth members holding down
her arms and legs.53
Before any determination is made as to whether the court may
adjudicate a particular claim arising out of a religious activity, it must be
determined whether the activity that occurred was the religious activity
claimed. Perhaps this is an issue of fact-whether the actions suffered
by Laura actually fell into the "laying hands" category of church ritual
that McCutchen described-to be determined by the fact-finder. Perhaps
it is to be decided by the church and deferred to by the court, though it
would seem entirely imprudent to allow a potential tortfeasor to define
his or her way completely out of potential liability. Either way, it is
reason enough to pause and ask ourselves whether the court is applying
constitutional protection to the "laying hands" ritual, or if, in this case, it
is applying constitutional protection to something entirely different. The
court, however, accepts-without questioning-that what occurred at the
Pleasant Glade Church was indeed a "laying on of hands" ceremony.
III. Intangible Harms
Mischaracterization aside, the court rests the bulk of its
reasoning on the idea that Laura Schubert's complaint alleged only
intangible injuries, (e.g., mental anguish, post-traumatic stress,
depression, etc.) and that under the Ninth Circuit's holding in Paul v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.54 the church had a
51. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
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defense of constitutional privilege against any claim that it had caused
intangible harms.55 Aside from this being factually inaccurate, as Chief
Justice Jefferson and Justice Johnson both point out in their dissents,5 6 it
misapplies the reasoning in the Paul case.
Paul concerned the liability arising out of a "shunning" ritual
that is a part of the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses.57 Paul had left the faith,
thus making herself an ex-Jehovah's Witness. Officials in the
organization ordered other adherents to abstain from communicating
with Paul as she was being "shunned" by the community. Many of the
adherents, who began shunning Paul, were childhood friends of Paul,
close acquaintances, and associates. Paul brought suit against the
organization alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and
outrageous conduct. The Ninth Circuit ruled that, "the practice of
shunning [does] not constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or
morality of the community as to warrant state intervention. 5 8  In that
case, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant damages for intangible injuries
(i.e., defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct)
that had arisen out of an intangible action (i.e., the practice of shunning)
associated with a religious belief.
59
In Schubert, the Texas Supreme Court employs the language
used in Paul in support of its argument that the Plaintiff cannot recover
55. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 8 ("the Ninth Circuit held that '[i]ntangible or
emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of
action against a church for its practice-or against its members.' Therefore, '[a]
religious organization has a defense of constitutional privilege to claims that it has
caused intangible harms-in most, if not all, circumstances."' (quoting Paul v.
Watchtower, 819 F.2d 875, 883 (1987))).
56. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., notes that "the Court states that because
Schubert's 'proof at trial related solely to her subsequent emotional or psychological
injuries,'. . .[a]s an initial matter, this is factually inaccurate. Schubert testified that
she suffered physical as well as emotional injuries from the assaults), 24 (Johnson,
J., observes that that Court "misread[s] the trial record as containing proof related
solely to her subsequent emotional or psychological injuries. Laura testified that
while she was going through the two episodes" she was "feeling pain . . . like
somebody was going to break [her] leg.").
57. Paul, 819 F.2d at 876.
58. Id. at 883.
59. Id. at 877.
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for the injuries she alleges. The court relies heavily on Paul noting:
"[t]he harms suffered by Paul as a result of her shunning by the
Jehovah's Witnesses are clearly not of the type that would justify the
imposition of tort liability for religious conduct."60 The court, however,
fails to put the language from Paul in its greater context. The very next
sentence from Paul asserts: "[n]o physical assault or battery occurred."'6
This entirely changes Paul's import for Schubert. In Schubert there was
assault and there was battery. The very two dispositive criteria the Ninth
Circuit expressly announced in Paul, that the plaintiff's claim was in
want of, are painfully present in Schubert. Laura Schubert suffered more
than just an "[i]ntangible or emotional harm[ ],,62 that provides the basis
for the actionable claim. It is the physical detention and the forcible
nature of the ritual that forms the basis of her claim.
The court, surprisingly, concedes that Laura's claims included
physical as well as emotional injury and that those injuries arose out of
63tangible, as well as intangible, actions. This, it seems, is not enough.
The court asserts that, though Laura claims physical injuries, her case
was not about those. Rather, her case was about the subsequent non-
actionable and intangible injuries. The court seems to contradict itself,
however, by noting that "Laura testified about her fear and anxiety
during these events, recalling that she had hallucinated, had trouble
breathing, feared that her leg might be broken, and feared that she might
die." 64 As was mentioned before, Justice Johnson points out that the
65
court seems to have just misread the record.
Oddly, the court ends the discussion of whether testimony of
physical injuries was present by stating that "any claim of physical pain
appears inseparable from that of her emotional injuries. 66 This is an odd
statement to make if the court is truly unconvinced that any physical
injury claims had been made. It might seem as though the court is doing
its best to dispose of any physical claim that may have been made,
60. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 8 (citing Paul, 819 F.2d at 873).
61. Paul, 819 F.2d at 873.
62. Id.
63. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 9-10.
64. Id. at 8.
65. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 9.
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whether by ignoring the claim altogether, misreading the record, or by
actively entangling the claim so as to make it inseparable from the non-
actionable claims.
IV. Separation of Damages
The court notes that the evidence Schubert put on at trial was not
significantly different from evidence she would have presented for a
6'
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim that had
68
already been dismissed by the court of appeals. In making the
comparison, the court cites Tilton v. Marshal 9 for support. In Tilton,
the court ruled that adjudication of a claim that the plaintiffs suffered
intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the defendant "making
insincere religious representations, and breaching promises to read,
touch, and pray over.., tithes and prayer requests ... would necessarily
require an inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs that is
forbidden by the Constitution., 70  This is clear from Tilton. A
determination as to whether a religious representation is "insincere"
would likely require a trial as to the merits of the representation. This
most certainly falls within the parameters of what the Free Exercise
Clause was meant to protect. Further, a finding of intentional infliction
of emotional distress would require a showing of outrageous conduct.71
Such is not the case in Schubert, as Chief Justice Jefferson points out.
7 2
67. Id. at 12.
68. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. App.
1998).
69. 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).
70. Id. at 681-682.
71. See City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) ("The
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous ... ").
72. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 16 ("This case is not like Tilton. False
imprisonment does not require a showing of outrageous conduct. Evaluating
whether Pleasant Glade falsely imprisoned Schubert does not require the fact finder
to determine 'the objective truth or falsity of the defendants' belief,' and neither does
awarding her emotional damages." (quoting Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 681 (citation
omitted))).
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Furthermore, the court asserts that it would be too difficult to
separate the damages inflicted as a part of the "psychological trauma
resulting from the discussion of demons at the church ' 73 from the mental
anguish resulting from the encompassed secular tort. The court supports
its tenuous footing by further suggesting that even if such a separation
were possible, it would still be unconstitutional to apply liability to the
church. The court notes that:
[e]ven if a jury could parse the emotional damages
attributable solely to secular activity, which is
doubtful, in Westbrook v. Penley, we emphasized
that even though the elements of a common law tort
may be defined by secular principles without regard
to religion, it does not necessarily follow that
application of those principles to impose civil tort
liability would not run afoul of protections the
constitution affords to a church's right to construe
and administer church doctrine.74
However, the constitutional protections upon which the court
fears intruding would no longer be in danger of breach if the jury was
allowed to separate the injuries relating to secular harms from injuries
relating to harms arising out of religious beliefs.
V. "Chilling Effect" of Liability
The court asserts that "imposition of tort liability for engaging in
religious activity to which the church members adhere would have an
unconstitutional 'chilling effect' by compelling the church to abandon
core principles of its religious beliefs., 75 This language makes clear that
the court is conflating the idea of chilling constitutionally protected
religious activity and chilling unprotected secular activity that was the
cause of action. However, considering these two separate and distinct
aspects of the same event, it appears evident that chilling the unprotected
secular activity is precisely the effect that one seeks to obtain by holding
the church liable.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 10 (citing Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007)).
75. See id.
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Unlike the Gleason case, which the court cites to support its
assertion, this case is not about a member of the church being
disciplined. In that case, the member had, by joining the church,
accepted the ecclesiastical role that the governing bodies of the church
play with regard to discipline of the individual members. In this case
there is no consent to be subjected to false imprisonment or assault at
76 ,,77
all. "This case is not about sanctioning voluntary religious practices,
but rather the concern is with the injuries arising out of a secular tortious
action on the part of the defendant. It is not, nor should it be, a concern
of the court if the application of tort liability on the church "chills" the
church from engaging in these types of tortious activities, which have
little to do with the religious beliefs and practices of its adherents.
VI. Application of "Neutral Principles" of Tort Law
In Employment Division v. Smith,78 the Supreme Court noted that
"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).", 79  As the court in Schubert notes, the
"fundamental principles of Texas common law [from which principles of
Texas tort law are derived] do not conflict with the Free Exercise
Clause" 8° and thus the court could resolve the issue in Schubert by
application of the neutral principles of tort law. The effect of this
approach is to apply laws and legal principles to actions presumably
arising out of religious beliefs, without hindering the belief itself. In
other words, where "a plaintiffs case can be made without relying on
76. Id. at 23 n.1 (Green, J., dissenting) ("If Schubert had consented to the
church's actions, the consent-under our familiar, neutral principles of tort law-
would have completely defeated her claims.").
77. Id.
78. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
79. Id. at 879 (citing and quoting United States v. Lee, 454 U.S. 252, 263, n.3
(1982)).
80. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 23 (Green, J., dissenting).
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religious doctrine, the defendant must be required to respond in kind." 81
This, Justice Green notes, is a case that concerns neutral principals of tort
law and not judicial "sanctioning [of] voluntary religious practices." 82
The court, however, rejects this possibility by asserting that the
plaintiffs claims in this case are not neutral at all. The court asserts that
"Laura's claims ... involve church beliefs on demonic possession and
how discussions about demons at the church affected Laura emotionally
and psychologically."83 This exclusive view of the injuries, however, is
not supported by the record nor by the damages Laura sought.
The court, rather, bases this view in large part on the fact that
even before litigation, Tom Schubert and Lloyd McCutchen had
84discussions regarding his position on demonic possession. It should be
noted, however, that Tom Schubert is a missionary associated with the
Assembly of God Church, and that there is no reason to presume that the
discussion of demonic possession and exorcism was not one focused on
ensuring the fidelity of the church's views on such subjects to the
85Biblical standard to which the church claims to adhere. There is no
indication that this talk or discussion had anything to do with the then
non-existent litigation. Not only is there no reason for the court's
unfounded assumption, there is reason to avoid making the assumption
that the discussion concerned other matters. The Schuberts alleged, in
their original petition, "that Laura was in serious emotional and physical
distress during the Wednesday night youth service .... They further
alleged she was restrained and held to the floor against her will and that
an exorcism was performed . . . [and] that this restraint caused Laura's
• • • ,,86
emotional injuries. There is no mention at all that there was any
contribution of the church's beliefs in demonic possession to Laura's
emotional injuries.
Despite this fact, the court asserts the most glaring non sequitur:
[B]ecause the religious practice of "laying hands"
and church beliefs about demons are so closely
81. Id.
82. Id. at 23 n. 1.
83. Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3, n.1.
86. Id. at 11.
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intertwined with Laura's tort claim, assessing
emotional damages against Pleasant Glade for
engaging in these religious practices would
unconstitutionally burden the church's right to free
exercise and embroil this Court in an assessment of
• • • 87
the propriety of those religious beliefs.
The court here makes inescapable the claim that the plaintiff
avoided making-a claim that would require an unconstitutional
evaluation of the religious beliefs of the defendant church. It is beyond
understanding why the court would concede that the plaintiff had made
the appropriate claim (emotional injuries due to physical restraint) and
then go on to make the wholly unwarranted inference that there is an
implied challenge to the beliefs that gave rise to the physical restraint.
By so doing, the court moves a religiously neutral challenge under the
protective umbrella of free exercise.
88
Laura's claims of false imprisonment and assault arise out of a
particular instance of "church members forcibly [holding] her arms
crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed" and being "held
in a 'spread eagle' position with several youth members holding down
her arms and legs.",8 9 These claims focus on the physical restraints
forced upon Laura while at the church, by the defendants and not, as the
court would have it, on "church beliefs on demonic possession."90 The
fact that these actions arose from a belief (if we may assume they did) on
the part of the defendants, that Laura was demonically possessed, does
not make that belief an issue in either a claim of false imprisonment or
assault.
Chief Justice Jefferson appropriately notes that, "[f]alse
imprisonment does not require a showing of outrageous conduct.
Evaluating whether Pleasant Glade falsely imprisoned Schubert does not
87. Id.
88. It is unclear why the court would unnecessarily remove such a claim to the
safety of a constitutional challenge. It is the lack of need to do so and the surplus of
legal maneuvering on the part of the court that causes us to pause and consider the
possible reasons.
89. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 3, 4.
90. Id. at 11.
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require the finder-of-fact to determine 'the objective truth or falsity of
the defendants' belief."9' Furthermore, it should be noted that emotional
damages are often the bulk of injuries resulting from claims of false
imprisonment and assault. The court seems to have voluntarily conflated
its own understanding of emotional injuries resulting from intangible
harms and emotional injuries resulting from physical harms.
VII. Abstention From Ecclesiastical Decisions
The Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States and
Canada v. Milivojevich92 established the principle that "[a]lthough the
Free Exercise Clause does not categorically insulate religious conduct
from judicial scrutiny, it prohibits courts from deciding issues of
,93
religious doctrine." However, it must be recognized that as was
previously discussed, the court's alleged intrusion into the affairs of the
church are not necessarily intrusions at all. The court only assumes that
it will have to decide the propriety of the church's beliefs concerning
demonic possession.
Furthermore, the court admits it is overreaching and does little to
•• 94
refute the effects of its decision. The court's sole defense against the
charge that it is overextending the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause is that it does not intend to do so. Responding to Chief Justice
Jefferson's accusation that the Court's decision of "sweeping immunity
is inconsistent with the United State Supreme Court precedent and
extends far beyond the protections our Constitution affords religious
conduct" 95 Justice Medina writes "that of course, is not our intent., 96 It
further reveals its cognizance of the effect of the decision by effectively
admitting to immunity for intentional tortfeasors that act against their
91. Id. at 16 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
92. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
93. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 11 ("Although the Free Exercise Clause does not
categorically insulate religious conduct from judicial scrutiny, it prohibits courts
from deciding issues of religious doctrine.").
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 13 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 11 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
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own adherents.97 The court goes on to say that "[p]articularly, when the
adherent's claim, as here, involves only intangible, emotional damages
allegedly caused by a sincerely held religious belief, courts must
carefully scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a
religious dispute.
' 98
The court, thus, not only extends the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, but considerably expands protection when the claims
involve adherents of the defendant's institution, and more so when the
only damages sought are intangible, emotional damages. This
effectively leaves no recourse for a variety of torts that might be
committed by the religious institution, such as: assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.99
CONCLUSION
Despite the careful posturing and logical maneuvering of the
Texas Supreme Court, it did nothing to protect the integrity of any
religion or of any church, much less the integrity of the Free Exercise
Clause. At best, the court weakened the integrity of the church by
granting it immunity from a tortious claim that might somehow arise out
of actions motivated by any religious belief.100  At worst, the court
commandeered the old contractual maxim caveat emptor and applied it
to anyone that might wish to "buy" into the views of a particular church.
The effect is to deny members of a religious institution certain recourse
for intangible injuries sustained from the tortious actions of the church.
This decision hardly vindicates Jefferson's "wall of
separation."'01 Rather, it seems to create a one-way door through which
the church may enter the secular realm, commit intentional torts upon its
97. Id. at 12 ("[R]eligious practices that might offend the rights or sensibilities
of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to
an adherent within the church.").
98. Id.
99. See id. at 15-21 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
100. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.").
101. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 282.
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adherents and escape liability by slipping back through the door through
which adherents may not pass. The notable playwright, Robert Bolt,
exposes the concerns of this type of ad hoc reasoning when applying the
law in his timeless play "A Man For All Seasons. '0 2
In the play, Sir Thomas More, of Utopia03 fame, is being urged
by members of his family to arrest a servant that has betrayed him. More
refuses on the ground that there is no law against betrayal. More's son-
in-law, Roper, admonishes him to consider that the servant has broken a
law, "God's Law." More responds that if he's broken God's law then
God can arrest him. Slighted by this, Roper responds indignantly,
"[t]hen you set man's law above God's!"'1°4 More replies: "No, far
below; but let me draw your attention to a fact-I'm not God. The
currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain
sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law,
oh, there I'm a forester." 10 5 Roper pushes More further: "So now
[would] you give the Devil benefit of law!"' 6 More confidently
responds:
Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through
the law to get after the Devil? ... [And if you did]
when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide... the laws all
being flat? This country's planted thick with laws
from coast to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if
you cut them down... d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
safety's sake. 107
The courts would be wise to heed the wisdom of this sixteenth
century scholar. Rather than refusing recourse to an injured citizen that
was, in the view of the church, demon possessed, for injuries suffered
102. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Vintage Books, 1962) (1960).
103. See THoMAs MORE, THE UTOPIA (Walter J. Black, Inc., 1947) (1518).
104. BOLT, supra note 102 at 65.
105. Id. at 65-66.
106. Id. at 66.
107. Id.
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due to the actions of the church, give the devil the benefit of law for our
own safety's sake.
